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Abstract
In this paper a secret sharing scheme based on the word prob-
lem in groups is introduced. The security of the scheme and possible
variations are discussed in section 2. The article concludes with the
suggestion of two categories of platform groups for the implementation
of the scheme.
1 Introduction
The problem of distributing a secret among a group of n persons in such
a way that it can be reconstructed only if at least t of them combine their
shares was solved independently by A. Shamir [5] and G. Blakley [1] in
1979. During the recent years several cryptographic methods used group
theoretic machinery (see e.g. [4]). In the present article, combining these
two fields, we use group presentations and the word problem in groups in
order to develop a new secret sharing scheme. It’s main advantage to the
schemes mentioned before is that it does not require the secret message to
be determined before each individual person receives his share of the secret.
In the section following the introduction the scheme is introduced. The
article ends with a general discussion about the scheme and some suggestions
concerning the platform groups which could be used for its implementation.
2 The scheme
Suppose that a binary sequence must be distributed among n persons in
such a way that at least t of them must cooperate in order to obtain the
whole sequence. The secret sharing scheme consists of the following steps:
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Step 1 A group G with finite presentation G =< x1, x2, . . . , xk/ r1, . . . , rm >
and soluble word problem is chosen. We require that m =
(
n
t− 1
)
.
Step 2 Let A1, . . . , Am be an enumeration of the subsets of {1, . . . , n} with
t-1 elements. Define n subsets of {r1, . . . , rn}, R1, . . . , Rn with rj ∈ Ri
if and only if i /∈ Aj , j = 1, . . . ,m, i = 1, . . . , n.
Then for every j = 1, . . . ,m, rj is not contained in exactly t-1 of the
subsets R1, . . . , Rn. It follows that rj is contained in any union of t of
them whereas if we take any t-1 of the R1, . . . , Rn there exists a j such
that rj is not contained in their union.
Step 3 Distribute to each of the n persons one of the sets R1, . . . , Rn. The set
{x1, . . . , xk} is known to all of them.
Step 4 If the binary sequence to be distributed is a1 · · · al construct and dis-
tribute a sequence of elements w1, . . . , wl of G such that wi =G 1 if
and only if ai = 1, i = 1, . . . , l. The word wi must involve most of the
relations r1, . . . , rm if wi = 1. Furthermore, all of the relations must
be used at some point in the construction of some element.
Any t of the n persons can obtain the sequence a1 · · · al by taking the
union of the subsets of the relations of G that they possess and thus obtaining
the presentation G =< x1, x2, . . . , xk/r1, r2, . . . , rm > and solving the word
problem wi =G 1 in G for i = 1, . . . , l.
A coalition of fewer than t persons cannot decode correctly the message
since the union of fewer than t of the sets R1, . . . , Rn contains some but not
all of the relations r1, . . . , rm. Thus such a coalition could obtain a group
presentation G′ =< x1, . . . , xk/ r
′
1, . . . , r
′
p > with p < m and G 6= G
′, where
wi =G 1 is not equivalent to wi =G′ 1 in general.
3 Remarks and implementation
It should be pointed out that, contrary to other schemes (e.g. Shamir’s,
Blakley’s scheme), the secret sequence to be shared is not needed until the
final step. It is possible for someone to distribute the sets R1, . . . , Rn and
decide at a later time what the sequence would be. In that way the scheme
can also be used so that t of the n persons can verify the authenticity of
the message. In particular the binary sequence in step 4 could contain
a predetermined subsequence (signature) along with the normal message.
Then t persons may check whether this predetermined sequence is contained
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in the encoded message thus validating it. One word of caution though, such
a use might make possible for less than t persons (or even a third party) to
discover all of the relations r1, . . . , rm. This can be made more difficult by
not specifying where exactly the signature should appear.
One method of attack to this system is to search the pool of possible
presentations of groups G =< x1, x2, . . . , xk/ r1, . . . , rm > that are used in
the first step and try to decode the transmitted message w1, . . . wl. This
task is easier if the attacker has some information concerning the encoded
message (e.g. the attacker may knows that a certain block of the message
contains a specific binary sequence/singature as discussed in the previous
paragraph). Thus, this pool must contain a large number of groups. The
reader may consult [4, 6.1.5] for further discussion on the efficiency of this
type of attack.
The above line of attack is expedited if the attacker possesses some of the
sets R1, . . . , Rn (e.g. he might be one of the n persons sharing the secret).
For this the reason we require in step 4 that a word w encoding 1 must involve
most of the relations. Because if someone possesses the relations r′1, . . . , r
′
p
and only them are involved in a word w =G 1 then he may decode correctly
the word since w =G′ 1 for the group G
′ =< x1, . . . , xk/ r
′
1, . . . , r
′
p >.
One way of creating a word representing 1 is by the product
l∏
j
[r′j , wj ]
where r′j is a relation, wj a random element, l a (large) natural number
and [a, b] = aba−1b−1 is the commutator of a and b. This kind of encoding
might, also, render useless some of the quotient attacks [4, 6.1.6]. A larger
set of relations in step 1 should make these attacks more difficult to use.
One the other hand, the fact that by using only the relationships contained
in Rj for a word w the person with this set can decode correctly the word,
may be used to send messages to a specific person secretly from the rest of
the group.
Finally we propose some categories of group presentations which could
be used in step 1:
Polycyclic groups: polycyclic groups with presentation
< x1, . . . , xk/x
ai
j = wij , a
a−1i
j = vij , a
rl
l = ul for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, l ∈ I >
where I ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, rl ∈ N for all l ∈ I, wij , vij , uj are words in
aj+1, . . . , ak and x
y = y−1xy. The interested reader may consult [3]
for a discussion on the use of polycyclic groups.
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Coxeter groups: Coxeter groups with presentation
< x1, . . . , xk/ (sisj)
mij = 1, i, j = 1, . . . , k >
where mij ∈ N ∪ {+∞}, mij 6= 0, mii = 1. There exists extensive
bibliography on Coxeter groups. A place to start is [2]. In there there
is reference on the word problem in Coxeter groups.
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